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Winn v. Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 23 (May 31, 2012)1
TORT LAW – MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Summary
Appeal from a district court summary judgment in a medical malpractice
action based on the statute of limitations under NRS 41A.097.
Disposition/Outcome
The accrual date for NRS 41A.097(2)’s one-year discovery period usually
presents a question of fact for a jury. However, when there is irrefutable evidence
that a plaintiff was put on inquiry notice of an injury, the district court should
determine the discovery date as a matter of law.
For the NRS 41A.097(3) tolling provisions to apply, a plaintiff must establish
(1) that the opposing party intentionally withheld information and (2) that the
withholding objectively hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from timely filing
suit.
One defendant’s concealment cannot serve as a basis for tolling NRS
41A.097(2)’s statutory limitations periods as to defendants who played no role in
the concealment.
Factual and Procedural History
On December 14, 2006, 13-year-old Sedona Winn underwent heart surgery
at respondent Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center (Sunrise). Respondent Michael
Ciccolo, M.D., performed the surgery, and respondents Robert Twells, CCP, and Lee
Steffen, CCP, were the perfusionists tasked with maintaining Sedona’s blood flow
during the surgery (collectively, the doctors).
The day after the surgery, Sedona’s father was notified that she had suffered
an “extensive brain injury” during the operation. The doctors were unable to give
an explanation for the injury.
Winn, acting as guardian ad litem for Sedona, hired an attorney to represent
him in a medical malpractice action against Sunrise and the doctors. In mid-January
2007, Winn’s attorney sent a letter to Sunrise requesting “all patient records”
relating to the surgery. Three days later Winn’s attorney sent a second records
request pusuant to a Social Security Disability benefits claim.
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On February 14, 2007, Sunrise provided Winn’s attorney with 182 pages of
records, including Dr. Ciccolo’s postoperative report from December 16, 2006. A
medical expert for Winn would later produce an affidavit noting that the
postoperative report indicated that a “notable volume of air” was present in
Sedona’s left ventricle at “inappropriate times during the procedure.”
Although the 182 pages of records sufficed to pursue the Social Security
claim, Sunrise did not provide Winn’s attorneys with additional records until
December 2007. Winn’s attorney did not receive a complete set of records, which
included a post-surgery MRI and CT scan, until February 12, 2008.
Using the complete set of records, Winn’s attorney procured an affidavit from
a medical expert that opined that Sunrise and the doctors had negligently caused
Sedona’s injuries. The expert primarily relied on the postoperative report that
Sunrise provided on February 14, 2007. Armed with the expert affidavit, Winn filed
suit against Sunrise and the doctors on February 3, 2009.
Each respondent moved to dismiss Winn’s complaint by claiming it was timebarred by NRS 41A.097(2). Each contended that more than a year had elapsed
between Winn discovering the injury and filing suit. The district court concluded
that Winn discovered the injury on December 15, 2006 (the day after the surgery)
and granted respondents’ motions. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Justice Parraguirre wrote the unanimous en banc opinion for the Court. After
explaining NRS 41A.097’s general framework,2 the Court identified the three
disputed issues. First, the parties disagreed on when Winn discovered the injury
and, therefore, triggered the one-year discovery period. Second, Winn and Sunrise
disputed subsection 3’s use of the term “concealed.” Finally, Winn and the doctors
disagreed on whether Sunrise’s alleged concealment could serve as a basis for
tolling the one-year discovery period as to the doctors.
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Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.097 states that:
2. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, an action for injury or death against a
provider of health care may not be commenced more than 3 years after the date of injury or
1 year after the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever occurs first…
3. This time limitation is tolled for any period during which the provider of health care has
concealed any act, error or omission upon which the action is based and which is known or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have been known to the provider of health
care.

NRS 41A.097(2)’s discovery date may be determined as a matter of law only when
the evidence irrefutably demonstrates that a plaintiff has been put on inquiry notice.
A plaintiff discovers his injury “when he knows or, through the use of
reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts that would put a reasonable
person on inquiry notice of his cause of action.”3 A person is put on inquiry notice
when he should have known facts that “would lead an ordinarily prudent person to
investigate the matter further.”4
The district court’s conclusion that Winn discovered Sedona’s injury on
December 15, 2006 as a matter of law, was improper because the accrual date for a
statute of limitations is a question of law only when the facts are uncontroverted.5
The record was unclear as to what respondents conveyed to Winn immediately after
the surgery. Also, it is unlikely that an ordinarily prudent person would begin an
investigation on the same day he was informed of a major problem in his child’s
surgery. Because the evidence did not irrefutably demonstrate that Winn
discovered the injury on December 15, 2006, the district court erred in determining
that, as a matter of law, the one-year discovery period accrued on this date. Instead,
the Court held that evidence irrefutably demonstrates that Winn discovered
Sedona’s injury no later than February 14, 2007 – the date when he received the
initial 182 pages of records.
Factual issues remain as to whether subsection 2’s one-year discovery period
should have been tolled due to Sunrise’s alleged concealment of records.
Winn argued that his February 3 2009, lawsuit was timely because the oneyear discovery period was tolled for concealment until the complete set of records
was provided on February 12, 2008. Winn claimed the complete records were
needed to secure the expert affidavit, and Sunrise denied that it “concealed” the
records. The Court concluded that factual issues remain as to whether the one-year
discovery period should have been tolled.
The Court found that subsection 3’s tolling provisions apply when the two
elements of concealment are present: (1) an intentional act by one party that (2)
prevents or hinders the other party from learning something. In addition to the
concealment element, plaintiff must also show that the information withheld
objectively hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from timely filing suit.
Accordingly, in order to toll the discovery period, Winn must establish: (1) that
Sunrise intentionally withheld information, and (2) that this withholding would
have hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from procuring an expert affidavit.
After finding that issues of fact remained on these two elements, the Court vacated
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the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Sunrise and remanded to give
Winn the opportunity to satisfy the two prong test.
One defendant’s concealment cannot toll the statute of limitations as to a second
defendant who played no role in the concealment.
Winn argued that the one-year discovery period was tolled as to all
respondents because of Sunrise’s alleged concealment. The doctors claimed that
tolling was inappropriate because they had not been accused of concealing anything.
The Court agreed with the doctors, relying on the defendant-specific language of
subsection 3 and public-policies behind the statute of limitations to hold that the
tolling provision applied only to the defendant responsible for the concealment.
Since Winn’s allegation of concealment was directed only at Sunrise, he could not
rely on subsection 3 as a basis for tolling subsection 2’s one-year discovery period
as to the doctors. The Court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor
of the doctors.
Conclusion
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions.
First, the Court found that questions of fact remained as to whether the oneyear discovery period was tolled because of concealment against respondent
Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center. Therefore, the Court vacated the district
court’s summary judgment on this issue and remanded for further proceedings.
Second, the Court found that the tolling-for-concealment provision did not
apply against the other respondents, and affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment in their favor.

